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Executive summary
• On 14 January 2020, the European Commission published its proposal for a Just 
Transition Mechanism, intended to provide support to territories facing serious socio-
economic challenges related to the transition towards climate neutrality. This brief 
provides an overview and a critical assessment of the first pillar of this Mechanism, the 
Just Transition Fund (JTF). 
• The JTF is supposed to rely on €7.5 billion of ‘fresh money’ from the EU budget, to be 
com-plemented by funds from member states’ European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and 
Europe-an Regional Development Fund (ERDF) envelopes, and by co-financing at the 
national level. All member states are eligible for the JTF, following the approval of their 
Territorial Just Transition Plans by the Commission. Funds are pre-allocated on a national 
level. Projects eligible for financing currently include projects aimed at economic 
revitalisation, social support and land restoration. 
• Given its small size, the JTF will not realistically be able to tackle effectively all three 
priorities. That is why we believe that it should fundamentally be amended to maximise 
its impact: funds should be allocated on a project basis (similar to the European 
Globalisa-tion Adjustment Fund) rather than sprinkled all across Europe on a 
geographical basis. 
• To be sure that the JTF fulfils its objective on mitigating the social and economic costs of 
the transition to a climate-neutral economy, we also recommend the following amend-
ments to the regulation: 
− Restrict eligible activities to social support and, to a lesser extent, land restoration; 
− Under social support, upskilling and reskilling policies should be combined with 
efforts to collect, harmonise and disseminate regional labour data; pension-bridging 
grants and mobility grants could also be added to the list of eligible activities;
− Eligibility for land restoration support should be restricted to sites where a company is 
no longer able to pay for restoration itself, to respect the polluter-pays principle; 
− Use NUTS3-level data in the allocation formula rather than NUTS2-level data, to en-
sure that all territories in need of help are counted in the JTF allocation fomula;
− Remove the mandatory transfer of ERDF funds into the JTF envelope and instead 
require member states to devote a portion of ERDF funds to the economic revitalisa-
tion of regions affected by the transition and identified by JTF allocation criteria, as a 
complement to the social support provided by the JTF.
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1 Introduction
Soon after unveiling the overall roadmap for its flagship European Green Deal initiative, the 
European Commission published its first concrete proposal on 14 January 2020, on how to 
establish a Just Transition Mechanism (European Commission, 2020a, 2020b and 2020c). The 
objective of this initiative is to provide support to territories facing serious socio-economic 
challenges arising from the transition towards climate-neutrality.
To reach the €100 billion of Just Transition Mechanism financing (for the period 2021-
2027) promised by European Commission President Von der Leyen, the initiative relies on 
three main pillars (European Commission, 2020a):
• The creation of a Just Transition Fund (JTF): the Commission wants to add €7.5 billion of 
‘fresh money’ to the total amount proposed in 2018 for the 2021-2027 Multiannual Finan-
cial Framework (MFF). This is supposed to trigger between €30 billion and €50 billion of 
additional funding for the regions most affected by the transition
• The use of a portion of the InvestEU financing devoted to climate to mobilise a total of €45 
billion of investment in ‘Just Transition’ projects between 2021 and 2027.
• The creation a public sector loan facility at the European Investment Bank partly guaran-
teed by the EU budget, to mobilise between €25 billion to €30 billion of additional public 
investments in 2021-2027.
At the time of writing, details on the second and third pillars of the Just Transition Mech-
anism are scarce, as the legislative proposals focus exclusively on how to establish a Just 
Transition Fund (European Commission, 2020b) and on how to include it in the EU cohesion 
policy framework (European Commission, 2020c). 
Concerning the InvestEU pillar, the Commission’s communication explicitly mentioned 
that the negotiations between the European Council and the Parliament on InvestEU, which 
led to an agreement in April 2019, will not be re-opened. This means that the Commission 
intends to set aside a portion of the financing devoted to InvestEU climate and environ-
ment-related investments for ‘just transition’ labelled projects. This represents a share of the 
provisioning of around €1.8 billion of the EU budget guarantee for the InvestEU programme, 
to reach €45 billion of investment in ‘Just Transition’ projects between 2021 and 2027. 
As far as the public sector loan facility pillar is concerned, the only detail provided for 
the moment is that the EU budget will contribute with a guarantee of €1.5 billion for the 
EIB. But the current proposal does not explain where this money will come from or what EU 
programme will have to be scaled back to create this new guarantee. In addition, such a tool 
might not be that useful at a time when EU countries can finance themselves very easily in the 
market at very attractive (and in some cases even negative) rates.
This briefing, prepared by Bruegel on the request of the European Parliament Committee 
for the Regional Development, focuses on the most concrete elements of the Commission’s 
proposals: the Just Transition Fund regulation proposal that lays down its objective, 
geographical coverage, the methodology for the allocation of resources and the content of 
the territorial just transition plans required to underpin the programming; and the targeted 
amendments of the Common Prevision Regulation (CPR) proposal, which will incorporate 
the JTF into the overall EU cohesion policy framework (in addition to the ERDF, ESF+, etc).
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2 Highlights of the European Commission’s 
proposal 
2.1 Objectives of the Just Transition Fund
The fund’s stated objective is to “alleviate the impact of the transition by financing the diversi-
fication and modernisation of the local economy and by mitigating the negative repercussions 
on employment”. In practice, in order to support territories facing serious socio-economic 
challenges arising from the transition towards climate neutrality, the Just Transition Fund 
will primarily provide grants to finance three types of project: 1) social support, 2) economic 
revitalisation, and 3) land restoration. 
2.2 Size and origin of the JTF funds
The Commission’s proposal foresees that the JTF will rely on €7.5 billion of ‘fresh money’ that 
is supposed to come on top of the Commission’s MFF proposal from May 2018 (European 
Commission, 2018). The initial €7.5 billion from the Just Transition Fund is expected to be 
complemented by transfers of funds from other EU programmes and by national co-financ-
ing.
To unlock €1 from the JTF, EU countries will have to re-allocate a minimum of €1.5 and a 
maximum of €3 from their ERDF or ESF+ envelopes to JTF projects (with a limit of 20 percent 
in each case), and they will also have to directly co-finance projects according to cohesion 
rules. That is why the Commission foresees that the overall financing capacity of the JTF will 
be between €30 and €50 billion.
Table 1 shows the minimum and maximum amounts of ERDF/ESF+ funds (in values and 
as a percentage of the total) that will be transferred to the JTF according to the Commission’s 
proposal. Table 1 also gives each country’s share of the JTF allocation and of the total of ERDF 
and ESF+ funds. Because of the difference in allocation methods (discussed below), the 
destination of the funds is quite different. Assuming that at the end of the MFF negotiations, 
the money for the JTF will not really be additional but taken from other cohesion policy funds 
(which is quite probable, as the discussion in the next section suggests), this would translate 
into a partial reallocation of €7.5 billion from some countries (mainly Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
and Hungary) to others (mainly Poland, Germany, Czechia and Bulgaria), as can be seen in 
column 8 of Table 1.
2.3 Geographical scope of the JTF and allocation to member states
The money will be available to all EU countries. The Commission’s proposal (annex 1 of Euro-
pean Commission, 2020b) provides a formula to determine how the funds will be distributed 
geographically, depending on the following factors, weighted as described: 
• The carbon intensity of a country’s NUTS2 regions (weighting 49 percent);
• Employment in mining of coal and lignite (weighting 25 percent);
• Employment in industry (weighting 25 percent);
• Production of peat (weighting 0.95 percent);
• Production of oil shale (weighting 0.05 percent).
Countries can be allocated a maximum of €2 billion; any amount exceeding this would be 
redistributed proportionally to the allocations of all other member states. The regulation also 
requires the allocation to represent at least €6 per capita (based on the entire population of 
a member state) over the entire period in each member state. Column 1 of Table 1 gives the 
allocation of the JTF to member states according to this methodology, and column 7 gives the 
proportion of the total allocation attributed to each country.
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(7) – (6) 
BE 68 1044 1027 102 - 204 4.9% - 9.8% 0.7% 0.9% +
BG 458 2292 4998 687 - 1374 9.4% - 18.8% 2.6% 6.1% + +
CZ 581 2428 9338 872 - 1743 7.4% - 14.8% 4.2% 7.7% + +
DK 35 161 189 53 - 70 15.0% - 20.0% 0.1% 0.5% +
DE 877 5506 9180 1316 - 2631 9.0% - 17.9% 5.3% 11.7% + +
EE 125 437 1465 188 - 375 9.9% - 19.7% 0.7% 1.7% +
IE 30 514 399 45 - 90 4.9% - 9.9% 0.3% 0.4% +
EL 294 5232 10222 441 - 882 2.9% - 5.7% 5.5% 3.9% -
ES 307 10722 22516 461 - 921 1.4% - 2.8% 11.9% 4.1% - -
FR 402 6383 8566 603 - 1206 4.0% - 8.1% 5.4% 5.4% +
HR 66 1902 5122 99 - 198 1.4% - 2.8% 2.5% 0.9% -
IT 364 13319 24321 546 - 1092 1.5% - 2.9% 13.5% 4.9% - -
CY 36 184 385 54 - 108 9.5% - 19.0% 0.2% 0.5% +
LV 68 652 2279 102 - 204 3.5% - 7.0% 1.0% 0.9% -
LT 97 913 2775 146 - 291 3.9% - 7.9% 1.3% 1.3% -
LU 4 19 19 6 - 7 16.1% - 20.0% 0.0% 0.1% +
HU 92 4257 10296 138 - 276 0.9% - 1.9% 5.2% 1.2% - -
MT 8 81 306 12 - 24 3.1% - 6.2% 0.1% 0.1% -
NL 220 490 597 217 - 217 20.0% - 20.0% 0.4% 2.9% +
AT 53 453 617 80 - 159 7.4% - 14.9% 0.4% 0.7% +
PL 2000 12660 40113 3000 - 6000 5.7% - 11.4% 18.9% 26.7% + +
PT 79 6725 10273 119 - 237 0.7% - 1.4% 6.1% 1.1% - -
RO 757 7414 15317 1136 - 2271 5.0% - 10.0% 8.1% 10.1% +
SI 92 704 1484 138 - 276 6.3% - 12.6% 0.8% 1.2% +
SK 162 2197 7388 243 - 486 2.5% - 5.1% 3.4% 2.2% -
FI 165 643 838 248 - 296 16.7% - 20.0% 0.5% 2.2% +
SE 61 839 995 92 - 183 5.0% - 10.0% 0.7% 0.8% +
Total 7 501 88 168 191 024 11139 - 21822 4.0% - 7.8% 100% 100% +
Source: Bruegel based on European Court of Auditors (2019), European Commission (2018) and European Commission (2020b). Note: amounts in euros are expressed in constant 2018 
prices.
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2.4 Eligible projects to be financed by the JTF
The regulation proposal provides details about the types of projects on which the money will 
be spent. Some of it will be used to invest in private projects and in particular in SMEs, but 
member states will also be able to use the funds to invest in human capital. The JTF will sup-
port a total of 11 types of activities which can be regrouped (apart from activity (k) ie technical 
assistance) into three broad categories1: 
• Economic revitalisation: (a) productive investments in SMEs, including start-ups, leading 
to economic diversification and reconversion2; (b) investments in the creation of new 
firms, including through business incubators and consulting services; (c) investments in 
research and innovation activities and fostering the transfer of advanced technologies; 
(d) investments in the deployment of technology and infrastructures for affordable clean 
energy, in greenhouse gas emission reduction, energy efficiency and renewable energy; 
(e) investments in digitalisation and digital connectivity; (g)  investments in enhancing 
the circular economy, including through waste prevention, reduction, resource efficiency, 
reuse, repair and recycling;
• Social support: (h) upskilling and reskilling of workers; (i) job-search assistance to job-
seekers; (j) active inclusion of jobseekers;
• Land restoration: (f ) investments in regeneration and decontamination of sites, land res-
toration and repurposing projects.
2.5 Governance and conditions to access the Just Transition Fund
In addition to the pre-allocation and the obligations to reallocate ERDF/ESF+ funds and to 
co-finance projects at national level, there are a number of other conditions for countries to 
access the JTF. Countries will have to submit ‘territorial just-transition plans’ to show that the 
funds are needed and where they will be spent. Countries will also have to demonstrate how 
they plan to fulfil their national climate objectives, as the proposal also mentions the (rather 
vague) need to be “consistent with their National Energy and Climate Plans and the EU objec-
tive of climate neutrality by 2050” and “steered by Country Specific Recommendations” of the 
European Semester. The following elements are described as requirements in member states’ 
territorial just-transition plans: 
• A timeline of key transition steps at national level;
• A justification for identifying the territories most negatively affected by the transition – 
these territories can be considered at any level, including NUTS3;
• An assessment of the challenges faced by these territories (estimated job losses, develop-
ment needs and objectives);
• A description of the expected contribution of the JTF to address these challenges; 
• An assessment of the consistency of JTF support with national transition plans; 
• A description of the governance set-up for implementation, monitoring and evaluation;
• A description of operations envisaged;
• Where support will be provided to non-SMEs, a list of all the operations and companies 
that will be included, along with a justification for their inclusion;
• A justification of support provided for investment aimed at achieving reductions in 
1 The regulation also explicitly disallows the JTF from financing the following activities: (a) the decommissioning 
or the construction of nuclear power stations, (b) the manufacturing, processing and marketing of tobacco and 
tobacco products, (c) undertakings in difficulty, (d) investment related to the production, processing, distribution, 
storage or combustion of fossil fuels, and (e) investment in broadband infrastructure in areas in which there are at 
least two broadband networks of equivalent category. 
2 Enterprises other than SMEs can also access funding from the JTF, on the condition that this is approved by the 
Commission as part of a country’s territorial just transition plan. 
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greenhouse gas emissions from particular activities3;
• Synergies with other EU programmes and pillars of the Just Transition Mechanism, to 
address identified development needs.
Access to the funds will be conditional on the approval of these plans by the Commission, 
whose evaluation will be based on all the above elements.
3 Assessment of the proposal and 
recommended amendments
3.1 Scope of the potential amendments to the regulation
To enhance the Commission’s proposal, the European Parliament could amend the following 
parameters of the JTF: 
• Its objectives (article 2);
• Its size (article 3);
• The scope of projects financed (article 4) or excluded (article 5);
• Its geographical scope and the allocation methodology (article 3 and annex 1);
• Its governance structure and the conditions attached to access the programme, ie the 
territorial plans and the criteria for approval by the European Commission (article 7);
• The transfers from the ESF+ and the ERDF (article 6 and article 21a of the amended CPR).
The following sections describe in detail how each of these parameters could potentially 
be amended, especially bearing in mind the mechanisms through which the JTF interacts 
with existing cohesion policy.
3.2 The main objectives and overall design of the Just Transition Fund
As the original proposal from the European Parliament to establish a ‘Just Transition Fund’ 
(European Parliament, 2017) highlighted, a just transition strategy requires policies to be put 
in place that will facilitate the transition into new jobs for those whose jobs are at risk. Even if, 
in net terms, the effect on employment of the transition could be neutral or even slightly pos-
itive, the transition will make some jobs disappear, while creating new ones. Sectors in which 
jobs could be lost include power generation using fossil fuels (including coal mines, fossil-fu-
el power plants and refineries), energy-intensive manufacturing, transport, the automotive 
sector, the equipment sector for fossil-fuel technologies and retail sales of fossil fuels (eg gas 
stations). In principle, these job losses will be compensated for by new jobs in sectors includ-
ing renewable energy installation, maintenance and operation, and construction (because 
of the need to renovate the building stock). The renewable energy sector should also create 
more domestic jobs than the fossil-fuel energy sector. But these new jobs could be in different 
regions or require different skills. If a change in the demand for skills is rapid, there is a clear 
role for authorities to ensure that the workforce (and in particular displaced workers with low 
skills) can be retrained successfully and quickly. It is thus crucial to invest heavily in human 
capital: adult education, re-training, and policies to improve the labour mobility of workers, 
in order to avoid high levels of unemployment in some particularly affected regions. That is 
why the European Parliament envisaged the EU Just Transition Fund as playing that role.
To do this, the Just Transition Fund could have been designed in line with the model of 
the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF), an institutional tool that has a fairly long 
3 The activities are those listed in Annex I of Directive 2003/87/EC.
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track record of acting in similar circumstances. The EGF was established in 2006 to support 
workers who lose their jobs as a result of major structural changes, originally from world trade 
patterns arising from globalisation. EU countries apply for funding from the EGF, and national 
or regional authorities oversee the deployment of project funds4. Over time, the EGF has 
been adapted to new economic and social challenges emerging in Europe5. The EGF’s flexible 
model (project-based, and without any pre-allocation of funds), which tries to help citizens 
directly, could thus be a template for the JTF to help people who lose their jobs as a result of 
the decarbonisation process.
3.3 Size and potential impact of the Just Transition Fund
Before discussing if the JTF is big enough, it is worth considering whether the €7.5 billion pro-
posed really constitutes ‘fresh money’, as claimed by the Commission. In our view, it is naïve, 
or even misleading, to claim that the funds devoted to the JTF will be additional to the EU 
budget, given that the first stage of the MFF negotiations is focused on agreeing on an overall 
headline number. This means that once an agreement is finally reached, the JTF will fall 
under this aggregate number and therefore the amount devoted to the JTF will mechanically 
reduce the funds devoted to other programmes. It will thus be important to check what other 
programmes will be affected, and if they would not have performed a similar role to the JFT. 
In such cases, the JTF would just amount to the renaming of pre-existing cohesion policies 
and its additional impact would be nil for the societal, economic and industrial situation of 
EU regions.
More generally, the proposal by the Finnish EU presidency (Council of the EU, 2019) 
mentioned an overall level of commitments for the EU budget representing 1.07 percent of 
EU GNI – ie €1087 billion (in 2018 prices) – for the period 2021-2027. Given that the Commis-
sion’s original proposal included a ceiling equal to 1.11 percent of EU GNI – ie €1135 billion 
– and that the Parliament originally proposed 1.30 percent – ie €1324 billion – this means that 
the proposal for the MFF currently under discussion in the Council is €48 billion below the 
original Commission’s proposal and €237 billion below the Parliament’s. So whether the €7.5 
billion constitutes fresh money appears very much irrelevant.
On the size of the JTF, one key element to note is that we could not find any justification for 
the €7.5 billion mentioned in the Commission’s proposal: there is no estimation of the needs 
of a Just Transition Fund based on its envisaged operations. In addition, although at first 
glance the headline number appears higher than the €4.8 billion requested originally by the 
Parliament (European Parliament, 2018), the intended scope of the JTF in the Commission 
proposal is much broader and includes missions other than just social support for workers 
who lose their jobs as a result of the transition. 
Whether the amount is sufficient or not is a question that cannot be answered before 
determining first what its exact scope should be.
3.4 Scope of the Just Transition Fund
As we have discussed, a comprehensive just transition strategy entails three sorts of actions to 
mitigate the social and economic costs of the transition to a climate-neutral economy: social 
support, land restoration and economic revitalisation. Unlike the original idea from the Eu-
ropean Parliament, the Commission envisages that the JTF will be able to deal with all these 
three objectives. However, given the very limited financial resources for the Just Transition 
4 The EGF can be triggered when more than 500 workers are dismissed by a single company, or if a large number 
of workers are laid off in a particular sector in one region or neighbouring regions. The EGF then provides up to 
60 percent of the funding for projects, lasting up to two years, to help workers who have lost their jobs to find new 
jobs or set up their own businesses. See Claeys and Sapir (2018) for more details on the functioning of the EGF, its 
evolution since its creation and how it could be improved to better fulfil its objectives.
5 In 2009, the EGF scope was broadened to also cover people losing their jobs as a result of the global financial and 
economic crisis; and in 2014, the categories of workers eligible for support were broadened to include young 
people not in employment, education or training (NEETs).
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Fund currently under discussion, it will not realistically be able to tackle effectively all three 
components, especially if it is supposed to be available to all member states. 
With this level of funding, we recommend that the European Parliament considers 
focusing only on two of the three components: social support and, to a lesser extent, land 
restoration. This is the only way to make it effective and also politically visible. This does not 
mean that economic revitalisation is not crucial. On the contrary, it should be an essential 
part of any just transition strategy. But given the major investment needed to transform 
the EU economy into a carbon-neutral economy – between €250 and €300 billion per year 
(Claeys et al, 2019) – compared to its small size, the JTF would anyway play a marginal (if not 
negligible) role in filling that gap. Economic revitalisation should thus be done with other 
instruments: by prioritising carbon intensive regions/territories via EU structural funds, by 
mobilising private funds thanks to the InvestEU initiative and the EU network of promotional 
banks, and by reforming EU fiscal rules to allow EU countries to invest much more in green 
investment (Claeys et al, 2019).
In any case, the eligible interventions under the JTF (as defined in article 4 of the regu-
lation) overlap with cohesion policy: almost all JTF activities are already covered under the 
ERDF and the ESF+ specific objectives. The only exception is “(f) investment in regeneration 
and decontamination of sites, land restoration and repurposing project”. Nevertheless, these 
activities partly overlap with the soil management and improved land use thematic priorities 
of the LIFE programme, and the specific objectives of the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development (EAFRD). This means that all these activities can anyhow be financed 
through other EU programmes (without the need for EU countries to submit territorial 
just-transition plans).
Moreover, providing an adequate amount of social support to the most affected citizens 
would already absorb most of the funds devoted to the JTF. Although the magnitude of job 
destructions caused by the transition to a low-carbon economy is particularly complex to 
estimate (and thus estimates should be treated with caution), the gross number6 of jobs at 
risk because of the transition in the energy sector alone – and thus the number of workers in 
that sector who could potentially need help to find another job – during the period 2021-2027 
could reach 1.6 million, according to IRENA (2018)7. The average amount of EGF funding 
awarded per worker to provide them labour market services over the period 2007-2016 was 
€4219. Using this amount as a benchmark for the services that could be provided by the JTF 
would already translate into a budget of €6.7 billion for the 2021-2027 period to help workers 
from the energy sector alone. And, as we know, many other sectors are likely to be affected 
by the transition, ranging from the automotive sector to the steel industry, meaning that €7.5 
billion would probably be insufficient even if only spent on social support.
To reflect the narrowing of the objectives of the JTF to social support and land restoration, 
the list of eligible JTF interventions could be refocused accordingly. The list should include 
the following eligible activities: (h) upskilling and reskilling of workers; (i) job-search assis-
tance for jobseekers; (j) active inclusion of jobseekers; (f ) investment in regeneration and 
decontamination of sites, land restoration and repurposing projects, while other activities 
– (a) to (e) and (g) – should be excluded. The regulation should also be made more precise to 
be sure that the activities financed by the JTF are really useful for the citizens who will benefit 
from them.
As far as social support is concerned, upskilling and reskilling should be conditional 
on proof that the retraining provided is in alignment with the needs of the regional labour 
market. In addition, on-the-job retraining or a combination of part-time working and part-
time retraining, should be prioritised to maximise the efficiency of the schemes (Sartor, 2018). 
6 The gross number is what matters because even if in net terms there are more jobs created than destroyed (and this 
is what most models suggest) the skills needed for the new jobs and their locations might differ from the jobs lost.
7 To use IRENA’s estimate of 7.4 million jobs lost for the 2018-2050 period and make estimates for the 2021-2027 
period, we make the simplifying assumption of linearity in the pace of job destruction.
The magnitude of job 
destructions caused 
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Moreover, the JTF should also support activities that develop regions’ capacity to collect, 
harmonise and disseminate labour data (including with neighbouring regions) – specifically, 
what skills are needed and where workers could find alternative jobs. This data would give 
workers a better overview of where they could move to for new jobs, given their skills and 
experience. Finally, although EU-level funds dedicated to direct income support are less 
necessary in the EU than, for instance, in the US, given the extent of the social safety net in 
most EU countries (especially in western countries) the JTF could nevertheless also include 
income support for transitioning workers, eg pension bridging grants, or mobility grants for 
workers who need to move for a new job. These activities should thus be added to the list of 
JTF-eligible actions.
Concerning land restoration projects, their eligibility for JTF funding should be strictly 
circumscribed. There was a good reason why this type of activity was excluded from previous 
EU programmes, which is to avoid providing bad incentives for polluting companies. One 
way to respect the ‘polluter pays’ principle could be to allow the financing of land restoration 
projects only when there is no company left to foot the bill.
3.5 Geographical scope of the JTF and allocation method
Given the high level of uncertainty about the impact of the transition on employment and its 
possible geographical distribution, we think it would have been preferable not to have any 
ex-ante geographical pre-allocation of the JTF funds. It would have been better to spend the 
money where the problem arises, as it is the case for the EGF.
However, given that the JTF was also created to convince some countries to commit to 
the EU’s ambitious climate targets, and in particular to reach climate-neutrality by 2050, it is 
politically understandable why there might be a need to show the EU’s firm (and quantified) 
commitment to these countries.
At the very least, if the pre-allocation system is retained in the final version of the legis-
lation, the weights or the variables of the allocation formula could be modified to take into 
account the redefined narrower scope of the JTF. 
Another desirable change in the allocation method would be to use NUTS3-level data in 
the formula instead of NUTS2-level data (even though data availability might be an issue at 
first), to be sure the funds can reach every territory where money is needed. We applied the 
JTF’s criteria for identifying “high carbon-intensity” regions at the NUTS2 and NUTS3 levels 
and found that 40 percent of the NUTS3 regions we identified as highly carbon-intensive did 
not belong to NUTS2 regions identified as highly carbon-intensive. While our estimates are 
subject to some uncertainty because of the lack of detail in the JTF allocation method (in par-
ticular on how greenhouse-gas emissions are converted to CO2-equivalent emissions), they 
give an idea of the discrepancy that can occur in the determination of high carbon-intensity 
regions depending on the level of granularity chosen. In the Commission’s current calcula-
tion, some highly carbon-intensive NUTS3 regions are not accounted for by the JTF allocation 
formula, simply because they are situated within a NUTS2 region which is not considered 
highly carbon intensive. This means that the allocation methodology might discriminate 
against some countries that will receive less money than what they would actually need.
The need to be granular seems to be recognised by the Commission, as the regulation 
proposal states that “in order to ensure the effectiveness of the Just Transition Fund, the support 
provided needs to be concentrated. The territories identified will therefore correspond to NUTS 
level 3 regions or could be parts thereof”. 
Moreover, as the JTF proposal stands at time of writing, the co-financing rate is set accord-
ing to the level of development of NUTS2 regions8. This means that NUTS3 territories that 
8 This is how we interpret the following sentence from the regulation (European Commission, 2020b): “The level 
of Union co-financing will be set according to the category of region in which the identified territories are located”. 
This sentence should further be clarified in the final legislation to indicate what NUTS level is meant by the term 
‘region’.
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are less developed than the NUTS2 regions in which they are located will have a lower rate of 
co-financing than they would otherwise have if this rate were determined at NUTS3 level. 
3.6 Governance: monitoring of spending by the Commission
Given the pre-allocation of funds, we believe that, at minimum, the conditionality should be 
strong enough to ensure that the funds are well used in order to achieve the objectives of the 
JTF. The Commission has proposed to unlock the funds on the basis of its approval of the so-
called ‘territorial just transition plans’, which need to include, in particular, “a description of 
the Member State’s commitment as regards the transition process consistent with their National 
Energy and Climate Plans and the EU objective of climate neutrality by 2050”. Two important 
issues need to be discussed in that regard.
First, while it is certainly good – from a policy consistency perspective – to link the ter-
ritorial just transition plans to National Energy and Climate Plans, it must be noted that the 
JTF cannot realistically be seen as leverage to push countries towards decarbonisation. The 
primary target of the JTF should be, in our view, to support workers who will lose their jobs 
as a result of the decarbonisation process. This, by itself, should help the transition by making 
necessary, but intrusive, climate policies socially, and thus politically, acceptable.
As a result of this, it might be more useful to structure the governance of the JTF on a 
‘mission oriented’, or project-based approach. This is the case with other EU programmes, 
including Horizon Europe and the LIFE Programme, and with the EGF (as we have noted). 
Evaluating individual projects with well-defined transparent criteria might enable better 
control of the use of the JTF funds by the Commission than an evaluation on the basis of the 
territorial just transition plans. As the experience of the European Semester suggests, these 
types of broad recommendation are barely implemented by EU countries (Efstathiou and 
Wolff, 2018).
3.7 Fund transfers from ERDF and ESF+ to the JTF
Given that we believe that the JTF should primarily be used to provide social support to those 
who will lose their jobs as a result of the transition, it might not be so useful to transfer to the 
JTF funds from other programmes, such as the ERDF9. However, because social support and 
economic revitalisation are complements and are equally necessary (to ensure that jobs are 
available for the re-skilled workers), it is paramount to ensure that, in a given region, both pol-
icies are implemented simultaneously. 
This could be ensured not by directly transferring funds from the ERDF to the JTF but by 
requesting that countries devote a certain amount of ERDF funds to the regions in which 
JTF funds are disbursed. The result might not be that different from what the Commission 
intended to do with its JTF proposal (to ensure both revitalisation and social support), but our 
improved version of the scheme would guarantee that enough money is spent on social sup-
port, while still ensuring that ERDF funds are redirected towards the economic revitalisation 
of regions affected by the transition.
9 This applies less to ESF+ funds which are also about social support.
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